Decisions of the Supreme Court of Judicature of Pelasgia

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  1. Tiburia

    Tiburia Well-Known Member

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    SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF PELASGIA
    About | History | Bench | Docket | Decisions | Rules| Access | Information | Press | Library
    Repository of Published Decisions of the Supreme Court by Year (AAD)

    About Decisions of the Supreme Court (AAD)
    The Decisions of the Supreme Court (Ἀποφάσεις τοῦ Ἀνωτάτου Δικαστηρίου - Apophaseis tou Anotatou Dikastiriou) often cited using its Pelasgian acronym, AAD, is the official reporter of the Supreme Court of Judicature of the Federative Republic of Pelasgia. By law, all decisions of the Court are published in the reporter as soon as possible after they are rendered. An online version of this archive, indexed exactly as the printed publication, is available for all Pelasgians, to facilitate legal education and access to justice. Translated versions of the decisions are published by the court for foreign crowds, but they lack official status and are not authoritative, unlike the original Pelasgian text.

    NB: Decisions of the former Supreme Court of Judicature of Pelasgian Empire are still rendered and included in the AAD registers, as they constitute valid precedent for the Court.


    Published Decisions by Year, in Order of Publication

    Anno Domini MMXIX
    - Pelasgian Civil Rights League v. Imperator, 1 AAD 2019, (2019) 1 AAD 1 - Constitutional [text]
    - Imperator v. Council of Pelasgian Nobles, et al., 2 AAD 2019, (2019) 1 AAD 2 - Constitutional [text]
    - Atlas Cement A.E. v. Zervas Steel A.V.E.E., 3 AAD 2019, (2019) 1 AAD 3 - Civil, Contractual [text]
    - Pagomenos v. Metropolitan Deme of Propontis, 4 AAD 2019, (2019) 1 AAD 4 - Civil, Extra-Contractual [text]
    - Koufos v. Kapetanaios Shipping Co., 5 AADD 2019, (2019) 1 AAD 5 - Civil, Contractual [text]
    - Imperator v. A., 6 AAD 2019, (2019) 1 AAD 6 - Criminal [text]
    - Soufiotis v. Imperator, 7 AAD 2019, (2019) 1 AAD 7 - Tax [text]
    - Ajax Insurance Co. v. Imperial Himyari Bank of Commerce A.E., 8 AAD 2019, (2019) 1 AAD 8 - Civil, Corporate [text]
    - Senatus v. Imperator (In Re Markopoulos), 9 AAD 2019, (2019) 1 AAD 9 - Constitutional [text]
    - Pelasgian Civil Rights League v. Propontis et Res Publica, 10 AAD 2019, (2019) 1 AAD 10 - Administrative, Constitutional [text]
     
    Last edited: Sep 4, 2019
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  2. Tiburia

    Tiburia Well-Known Member

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    SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PELASGIAN EMPIRE
    Citation: Imperator v. Lambropoulos et al. (Application for Leave to Appeal)
    Application considered: 16 July 2019
    Decision rendered: 17 July 2019
    Status: Dismissed

    Ioannes Lambropoulos et al.
    Applicants

    v.

    His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor (via Appeals Procurator of Propontis)
    Respondent

    Coram: Anastasiades, Theophilos, Alexopoulos, Nikomachides, Palaiologos, Koressios, Triantaphyllou JJ.
    Reasons: The Court

    APPEAL SOUGHT FROM: Propontis Criminal Court of Appeal

    The Court's Reasons:


    The application for leave to appeal from the judgment of the Propontis Criminal Court of Appeal, Number P47897, 2019 APEP 706, dated July 14, 2019, is dismissed with costs.

    As per the Rules of the Supreme Court of Judicature of the Pelasgian Empire, leave to appeal may be granted when a novel question of law of sufficient significance to the administration of justice is raised by the case at bar. Having examined the application deposited by the appellant to this Court, the Court cannot see any such question as being raised by this case. In the Court's opinion, this is but a typical case of Penal Law; publicity, both domestic and international, is insufficient to propel a case to such a status that it might warrant review by the Supreme Court of Judicature. Such an event would create an overly litigious society, and would institutionalise a court of public opinion, overturning the Court's Constitutionally-enshrined control over its own docket.

    Moreover, as per the same Rules of the Court, appeals as of right, that is to say appeals which do not require leave, exist only in cases of a clear and overriding error of law by a lower court, such that a failure to correct the said error would result in a clear and grave prejudice to the Administration of Justice in the Realm. Appeals as of right may also exist in cases where the legally prescribed or court-ordained penalty for an offence is of extreme severity, such as capital punishment. Neither of these criteria is fulfilled by the case at bar; as stated before, this is but a typical case of Penal Law, and the Court detects no overriding error, or indeed no clearly discernible error at all, in the conduct, judgement and the decision of the Propontis Criminal Court of Appeal, whose Justices may be said to have done their job in an exemplary fashion. Likewise, the present penalty concerns a withdrawal of a temporary exemption from military service, a typical punishment for young criminals engaged in tertiary studies, and a number of years on parole, a most lenient and typical punishment of the Empire's Penal Law. As such, neither ground for an appeal as of right is met.

    Since the appellants have failed to establish any of the criteria for an appeal by leave or an appeal as of right, the Supreme Court of Judicature cannot but dismiss their application. Such a move is in the public interest and in the interest of the Administration of Justice, to give time and space to more pressing and important cases to be heard by the highest Court of the Realm.

    CASES CITED: None
    STATUTES CITED: Rules of the Supreme Court of Judicature of the Pelasgian Empire; Constitution of the Pelasgian Empire
    AUTHORS CITED: None

    For all decisions regarding applications for leave to appeal to the Court, please see: www.scj.gov.pg/aad/aea
     
    Last edited: Jul 17, 2019
  3. Tiburia

    Tiburia Well-Known Member

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    SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PELASGIAN EMPIRE
    Citation: Senatus v. Imperator (In Re Markopoulos)
    Appeal heard: 22 July 2019
    Judgement rendered: 24 July 2019
    Record no: 9 AAD 2019
    Published: (2019) 1 AAD 9

    Senate of the Pelasgian Empire
    Applicant

    v.

    His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor
    Respondent

    Coram: Papatheodoropoulos C.J., Anastasiades, Theophilos, Alexopoulos, Nikomachides, Palaiologos, Koressios, Triantaphyllou, Makriadis, Michalopoulos, Andreou, Solonos, Sampson, Psychogios, Nomikou JJ.
    Reasons: Papatheodoropoulos C.J. (Solonos, Alexopoulos, Alexopoulos, Nikomachides, Koressios, Palaiologos and Psychogios JJ. dissenting)

    ON APPEAL FROM: The Supreme Court of Justice is the Court of First Instance for this case, as per Article 12 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Judicature.

    Summary of Papatheodoropoulos C.J.'s reasons prepared by a clerk of the court (unofficial translation published by the Court):

    The application by the Senate of the Pelasgian Empire ("the Senate") should be granted, with costs. The Imperial Decree of 20 July 2019 invoking the Imperial Veto against the election of the Presiding Magistrate of the Legislative Council of the Senate should be suspended and declared of no force and effect. The Appointment of Konstantinos Markopoulos by the Senate should be restored immediately, with full force and effect.

    The present appeal concerns a decree issued on July 20th of this year by His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor ("the Emperor") invoking the Imperial Veto to overturn the appointment of Senator Konstantinos Markopoulos to the position of Presiding Magistrate of the Legislative Council, the Senate's lower house, by the Senate following a majority vote on July 19th. In response to the publication of this Imperial Decree ("the Decree), the Senate moved to file an application to declare the Decree of no force and effect. To this end, the Senate filed an application to have the case directly heard by the Supreme Court as the Court of First Instance as per Article 12 of the Rules of the Court. The application to have the case heard was granted on July 21th by this Court.

    The questions of law on which the present case centres, which are drawn from the factum of the applicant, can be summarised thus:

    1. Does the Emperor have the power to invoke the Imperial Veto over an appointment of an officer of the Senate by the Senate itself?

    2. Is the Emperor's assent required for all appointments of all Offices of State in the Realm, including those of the Senate? Does the Emperor hold Sovereignty over the Senate, or is the Senate separately Sovereign from the Throne?

    3. Since the Emperor is appointed by the Senate, can the Senate override the Emperor's invocation of the Imperial Veto by a vote? If so, what sort of majority is necessary?

    4. Can the Emperor invoke his duty to maintain Peace and Prosperity of the Realm, as outlined in Part III of the Constitution, to intervene in the affairs of the Legislative branch of Government, contrary to the wishes of the Senate?

    The Imperial Veto is an important part of the Imperial Prerogative, that is to say, of the residual powers of the Emperor recognised by the Pelasgian Constitution. The Imperial Veto allows the Emperor to reject any decision or act of any other branch of government which normally requires Imperial Assent, and to remit the decision to the branch in question for reconsideration. This is an important safeguard of the Pelasgian political system, which is backed by centuries of precedent, and which is expressly recognised in the Supreme Law of the Empire. However, the Imperial Veto, just like the Imperial Prerogative at large, is not limitless and undefined. Indeed, the Imperial Veto is very narrowly and clearly circumscribed the Constitution of the Pelasgian Empire, to avoid the Empire's sliding back into the pre-Constitutional epoch of Imperial Autocracy and Absolutism. Among the many well defined and well established limits of the Imperial Veto is its inapplicability to matters which do not require Imperial Assent and which fall outside the duties of the Throne. The appointment of Senatorial officers is such a matter, as it does not require Imperial Assent and is completely divorced from the duties and powers of the Throne. In this particular case, the Presiding Magistrate is meant to ensure the smooth operation of the Senate's lower house, and, from time to time, to make representations in its name to the Throne. If the Presiding Magistrate's appointment were to be controlled indirectly by the Emperor via the Imperial Veto, the ability of the Presiding Magistrate to coordinate and represent the legislative branch of government in a manner independent of the considerations and interests of other branches of government would be greatly handicapped, if not outright abolished. This is exactly the sort of unconstitutional evil that the clear limitation and delineation of the Imperial Prerogative by the Constitution was meant to achieve by its Authors at the time of its adoption by the Pelasgian Empire. The first question must thus be answered in the negative.

    The Emperor's Assent is not required for every appointment in the Realm. Indeed, the Emperor is largely connected to the executive branch of government, and cannot intervene in the appointment of officials of other branches of government where this does not directly concern the Throne's Constitutionally-ascribed duties; the appointment of independent Judicial officials, such as the Chief Bailiff of the Supreme Court of Judicature, or of Senatorial officials, such as the Presiding Magistrate of the Legislative Council, is a chief example of such appointments. By contrast, the appointment of Ministers and Secretaries of State is subject to the Imperial Veto as it falls directly under the executive branch of government. Likewise, the appointment of Justices of the Supreme Court and the granting of Imperial Assent to Acts of the Senate are subject to the Imperial Veto; though they fall under the judicial and legislative branches of government, respectively, they are duties directly ascribed to the Emperor in the written Constitution of the Pelasgian Empire. In the Pelasgian Constitution, both the Emperor and the Senate exist as manifestations of Sovereignty, each within its own domain of power; this sets them apart from the Judiciary, which does not hold Sovereignty in and of itself, but draws itself from the Sovereign power invested in it by the Emperor and the Senate. Each Sovereign domain of power in the Pelasgian Constitution is separate. The two domains are akin to watertight compartments, and while some drops might be allowed to go through on either side in practice, large leaks threaten to sink the delicate ship of Pelasgian Constitutionalism. The invocation of the Imperial Veto against the appointment of a chief Senatorial Magistrate is such a crippling leakage. The first half of the second question must thus be answered in the negative, and the second half in the affirmative.

    For the same reasons given in the court's response to the second question, an attempt by the Senate to override the Imperial Veto where it has been legitimately invoked would be a crippling and flooding leak into the compartment of the Emperor's Sovereign domain of power. As for any cases of illegitimate invocation of the Imperial Veto, the Veto itself is of no force and effect ipso facto; therefore, the Senate does not need to do anything to invalidate and already invalid Veto in such cases. The first half of the third question must thus be answered in the negative. The court must thus decline to answer the second half of the third question, since it presupposes an affirmative answer to the first half.

    The well-known Peace and Prosperity is a preambulatory clause to Part III of the Pelasgian Constitution, which has evolved into a complementary residual powers clause to the Imperial Prerogative in that same part of the Pelasgian Constitution. It effectively grants to the Throne and the Throne's agents, that is to say, the executive branch of government of the Pelasgian Empire, to power to make extraordinary laws to ensure to Peace and Prosperity of the Realm in the face of unforeseen or unprecedented circumstances and crises. In Imperator v. Philistaea, President of the Council of State Damianos (as he then was) interpreted an emergency covered by the Peace and Prosperity clause as "being of immediate and substantial danger to the Polity and the Nation, such that the mechanism of State, in its typical operation, would be either too slow or inefficient, or wholly incapable altogether, of dealing with the threat. Such a threat need not be downright existential to the Realm, but it must threaten the Peace and Prosperity of the Pelasgian State, the Pelasgian Nation and the Pelasgian Public, and the legitimate interests thereof, in such a manner that a failure to deal therewith in a timely and effective manner by the Authorities of the Pelasgian Empire would lead to irreparable damage to the aforementioned and their above outlined interests" (para 87). That case concerned the Central Government's enactment of laws directly conflicting with the traditional separation of power to deal with the then extant Philistaean Emergency during the Augousto-Septemvriana, though Damianos C.C.S. clearly stated that the clause may be invoked to legitimately override the Constitution's separation of powers, for a limited time. In my humble opinion, there is no such crisis present at this time, not that the Emperor has even attempted to demonstrate the existence of such a crisis. Instead, general and rather vague claims about the need to protect the unity of the Realm following the National Schism have been made. In my view, this is a matter for the elected representatives of the Realm and the legitimate officials of power to decide amongst themselves. Though negotiations might be hard and might not always work out, one branch of government cannot invoke residual powers clauses to force its preferred compromise through, or reject the lawful political actions by others, merely out of fear or apprehension, no matter how honest, about the future effects of those actions. Otherwise, the perpetual fear of some degree of political dispute and disunity, which is always present in a multi-party and parliamentary society, could be used to justify absolutism and tyranny ex post facto. The fourth question must thus be answered in the negative.

    CASES CITED: Imperator v. Philistaea [...]
    STATUTES CITED: Constitution of the Pelasgian Empire [...]
    AUTHORS CITED: [omitted]

    Summary of Solonos J.'s dissenting reasons prepared by a clerk of the court (unofficial translation published by the Court): [...]

    For the complete decision, please see: www.scj.gov.pg/aad/aad/en/2019/9
     
    Last edited: Jul 24, 2019
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  4. Tiburia

    Tiburia Well-Known Member

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    SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF PELASGIA
    Citation: Pelasgian Civil Rights League v. Propontis et Res Publica
    Appeal heard: 1 September 2019
    Judgement rendered: 4 September 2019
    Record no: 10 AAD 2019
    Published: (2019) 1 AAD 10

    Pelasgian Civil Rights League
    Appellant

    v.

    Federal City of Propontis (via Attorney General of Propontis)
    Respondent

    And

    Federative Republic of Pelasgia (via Attorney General of Pelasgia)
    Respondent

    Coram: Papatheodoropoulos C.J., Anastasiades, Theophilos, Alexopoulos, Nikomachides, Palaiologos, Koressios, Triantaphyllou, Makriadis, Michalopoulos, Andreou, Solonos, Sampson, Psychogios, Nomikou JJ.
    Reasons: Papatheodoropoulos C.J. (Anastasiades, Andreou and Psychogios JJ. dissenting)

    ON APPEAL FROM: Propontis Administrative Court of Appeal

    Summary of Papatheodoropoulos C.J.'s reasons prepared by a clerk of the court (unofficial translation published by the Court):

    The appeal by the Pelasgian Civil Rights League ("the PCRL") should be denied, with costs. The Executive Decree of 20 August 2019 declaring that the unauthorized march known as First Propontis Pride (“the gathering”) was an unlawful gathering and ordering it dissolved was lawful and reasonable. The conduct of the forces of the Propontis Directorate for Public Security during their suppression of the gathering was not excessive and was reasonable. The Law on the Promotion of Anti-Social Activities and ss. 353-357 of the Penal Code are Constitutional.

    The present appeal is the merger of two appeals resulting from the lawsuits filed by the PCRL. The first suit was filed in the Propontis District Court and concerned the Federal City’s Response to the gathering, which the PCRL alleged was illegal, excessive and unreasonable. The second suit was filed in the Propontis Administrative Court of First Instance and concerned the alleged unconstitutionality of the Law on the Promotion of Anti-Social Activities and ss. 353-357 of the Penal Code, which have the cumulative effect of outlawing the “public promotion, endorsement or manifestation of behaviours contrary to the established norms of society and detrimental to its cohesion and good health, as well as the normal development of its members”, particularly “activities related to abnormal or deviant sexual preferences and tendencies”. In both suits, the trial court sided with the respondents, the Attorney General of the Federal City of Propontis (“the City”) and the Attorney General of the Federative Republic of Pelasgia (“the Republic”). The PCRL then appealed both decisions to the Propontis Administrative Court of Appeal, resulting in the denial of both appeals by the Court of Appeal. Finally, the PCRL applied for leave to appeal to this Court for each case separately. The application was granted on 29 August 2019, at which point the Court decided to merge the two appeals into one, as per the Rules of the Court.

    The questions of law on which the present case centres, which are drawn from the factum of the applicant, can be summarised thus:

    1. Did the Metropolitan Council of Propontis and the Metropolitan Governor of Propontis act reasonably and lawfully when applying their executive discretion regarding the declaration of illegality of the gathering?

    2. Did the forces of the Propontis Directorate for Public Security act lawfully and reasonably, using a justified degree of force, during the suppression of the gathering following the declaration of its illegality?

    3. Does the Common Parliament of Pelasgia have the authority to use its power over Criminal Law as outlined in Section III of the Constitution to enforce public morality, such that the Law on the Promotion of Anti-Social Activities and ss. 353-357 of the Penal Code would be a justified use of that power?

    4. Do the Law on the Promotion of Anti-Social Activities and ss. 353-357 of the Penal Code unreasonably and disproportionately infringe the rights and freedoms of Pelasgian citizens, particularly the right to peaceful assembly, the freedom of association and the freedom of individual expression, as outlined in Section II of the Constitution?

    The Metropolitan Council of Propontis and the Metropolitan Governor of Propontis have the right, as per the Constitution of the Federal City of Propontis and as per Article 102 of the Federal Constitution, to enact executive decrees with the purpose of dealing rapidly and effectively with such issues as may from time to time arise in the City that cannot be directly dealt with by a general application of the City’s existing laws. Included in these powers is the power to declare any gathering in the city, whether licensed or unlicensed “unlawful, abusive and otherwise contrary to the general or specific provisions of Public Order”. The hurdle for licensed gatherings to be thus declared is higher than for unlicensed gatherings; as the gathering in the case at bar was unlicensed, the Court shall not dwell on this distinction. It is well established in the jurisprudence of Pelasgia and the statutes of the Republic that any gathering, whether licensed or not, which contravenes the Public Law of the Republic and threatens the general peace and prosperity of the Republic or the general public order of a Federal Subject can be declared unlawful by the Government of the Republic or of any of its Federal Subjects via an executive order (see in particular Bogiatzis v. Regency Council and Citizens’ Alliance v. Iolcus). In the case at bar, the gathering directly contravened the Law on the Promotion of Anti-Social Activities and ss. 353-357 of the Penal Code. This is a finding of fact by the Propontis District Court which the appellant has not sought to challenge in its submissions before this Court. Therefore, it must be accepted as is. Based on this assumption, the Court cannot but find that the City’s authorities acted reasonably and lawfully, and applied their discretion in a lawful and reasonable manner. The first question must thus be answered in the affirmative.


    The Public Security forces of the City acted as directed by the City’s Secretary for Public Security and Civil Protection to enforce the decree outlined in the previous paragraph. The City deployed forces specially trained in anti-riot tactics and equipped with special equipment suited to that task to dissolve the illegal gathering. This is a standard practice which has been observed across the country since the inception of riot police units in Pelasgia; the legality of those units and their tactics was confirmed in Thermi v. Bouloukos; that case concerned the use of such forces by Thermi Cities Police to quell riots by fans of the city’s football club following its disqualification from National League I. There has not been a significant evolution in the state of the Law in Pelasgia that would justify this court’s reexamination of that decision. Based on the aforementioned case, and the already established legality of the City’s decree in the previous paragraph, prima facie reasonableness, proportionality and legality of the City’s response is established. Moreover, though force was used by the City’s forces, this force was not excessive, as it was a response to initially passive and active resistance, and then active aggression, on the part of the gathering’s participants, and it did not result in any deaths or severe injuries. As such, the second question must be answered in the affirmative.

    The power of the Common Parliament and the Federal Government of Pelasgia over Criminal Law is established by Section III of the Constitution of Pelasgia. This is one of the Federal Government’s most important powers, as it allows it to regulate or prohibit a whole host of behaviours, acts and omissions using the force of the state, and the threat of criminal sanction. The Criminal Law is one of the fundamental pillars of any state, and is an evolution of one of the central corrective and normative functions of the collective conscience of any society, no matter how primitive or advanced. The ability of the Senate of Southern Tibur to use the Criminal Law power to enforce morality was established in the so-called “immorality trilogy” of Imperator v. V., Imperator v. M., and Imperator v. R., which dealt with challenges to the Constitutionality of Criminal Law provisions outlawing public solicitation by prostitutes, on-demand abortion, and narcotics. The validity of this doctrine following the transition to the Pelasgian Empire was upheld by the Court of Cassation in Imperator v. A.B., which dealt with Criminal Law provisions outlawing certain omissions related to the prevention of suicide. It is the view of the Court that no change in the legal of the regime country has occurred with respect to Criminal Law or the Common Parliament’s power thereover that would justify any alteration of the doctrine of morality in the Criminal Law. The enforcement of general public morality remains a legitimate objective of the Criminal Law power; it is indeed, one the fundamental uses thereof, if not the most fundamental of its uses. Any society, no matter how evolved, must retain some way to enforce its most fundamental common values, such as the sacredness of human life, and compliance therewith upon all its members. In a modern, organised society of laws, such as ours, the Criminal Law power fulfills that role. With regard to the particular application of the power in the case at bar with regard to the impugned legislation, the Court must recognise the superior positioning of the Common Parliament to weigh the wide variety of interests, necessities, realities and influences of society and to make determinations as to common morality. This superior positioning derives from the Common Parliament’s popular mandate, as well as its function, form and role in the Constitution of Pelasgia. As such, the third question must be answered in the affirmative.

    The rights and freedoms enshrined in Section II of the Constitution of Pelasgia are meant to be interpreted and applied in a broad and expansive manner, so as to adequately defend the liberties of all Pelasgians. Otherwise, these rights and freedoms would be entirely meaningless, a sham behind which the Republic or the Federal Subjects could hide to oppress and dominate the citizenry without any real check upon their power. However, all rights and freedoms must have and do have reasonable limits, such that can be justified in a free and democratic society of laws. Unchecked freedom (hypereleutheria in Pelasgian) leads to anarchy and unchecked rights-based entitlement (dikaiomatismos in Pelasgian) leads to general disorder and ungovernability. It is thus incumbent upon the authorities of the Republic and the Federal Subjects to legislate and to act to reasonably restrict these rights and freedoms. These restrictions are not detrimental to the rights and freedoms of Pelasgians. On the contrary, they are fundamental to the preservation of the said rights and freedoms, for no right and freedom can be preserved in a state of general anarchy or ungovernability; this, after all, is the fundamental purpose of the State. In the case at bar, it has been admitted by both sides that the impugned legislation has the effect of restricting the right to peaceful assembly, the freedom of association and the freedom of individual expression. However, to determine whether this restriction is unreasonable to the point of unconstitutionality, the Court must examine it based on the framework outlined by the Court in Pelasgian Civil Rights League v. Imperator. Based on this framework, the restriction is not arbitrary, as it has the significant objective of preserving public morality as its goal (as outlined in the previous paragraph). Moreover it is not disproportionate, nor is it overbroad, being particularly tailored to the aforementioned objective and infringing public liberties as little as possible. As such, the fourth and final question must be answered in the negative.

    CASES CITED: Bogiatzis v. Regency Council, Citizens’ Alliance v. Iolcus, Thermi v. Bouloukos, Imperator v. V., Imperator v. M., and Imperator v. R., Imperator v. A.B., Pelasgian Civil Rights League v. Imperator [...]
    STATUTES CITED: Constitution of the Federal City of Propontis, Constitution of the Federative Republic of Pelasgia, Law on the Promotion of Anti-Social Activities, Penal Code [...]
    AUTHORS CITED: [omitted]

    Summary of Anastasiades J.'s dissenting reasons prepared by a clerk of the court (unofficial translation published by the Court): [...]

    For the complete decision, please see: www.scj.gov.pg/aad/aad/en/2019/10
     
    Last edited: Sep 4, 2019
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